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Introduction
The UK has experienced a steady increase in immigration in recent years. Until the mid-1990s
immigrants accounted for less than 8% of the working age population in the UK. Today they account for more than 12% (Figure 1 ) 1 . There is considerable heterogeneity in the geographic distribution of immigrants. Table 1 There is a large literature looking at the labour market impact of immigration 2 . The general conclusion is that immigration has only small adverse e¤ects on employment and wages. For the UK this result is con…rmed by Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2005) , who …nd no strong evidence that immigration has overall e¤ects on employment, participation and wages. This article takes a di¤erent perspective and looks at the e¤ect of immigration on the housing market. It follows the dominant methodology in the literature and uses spatial correlations between immigrant in ‡ows and changes in house prices in di¤erent geographic areas. To avoid the possible endogeneity resulting from the fact that immigrant in ‡ows are themselves the outcome of economic decisions, an instrumental variable based on the settlement pattern of immigrants in an earlier period is used.
This identi…cation strategy is based on the tendency of newly arriving immigrants to settle in places where previous immigrants from the same country already live.
The sign and magnitude of the e¤ect of immigration on house prices is theoretically ambiguous. In principle, immigrant in ‡ows would increase the demand for housing. Combined with an upward-sloping housing supply, this would lead to an increase in house prices and rents. However, immigration may be associated with o¤setting native out-migration. If the o¤set is complete, local population would remain constant. In this case housing demand may still be a¤ected if the change in composition of the local population leads to a change in local income. This would a¤ect housing demand and house prices and rents via an income e¤ect.
Studies of the impact of immigration on house prices and rents generally …nd a positive e¤ect. Saiz (2007) looks at house prices and rents across cities in the US. He …nds that an immigration in ‡ow equal to 1% of a city's population is associated with an increase in average rents of about 1% and an increase in average prices of 2:9 to 3:4%. For Switzerland, Degen and Fischer (2009) …nd that an immigration in ‡ow equal to 1% of an area's population increases prices of single family homes by about 2:7%. For Spain, Gonzalez and Ortega (2009) …nd a coe¢ cient of 3:2% for house prices. In contrast to these studies, Akbari and Aydede (2009) and Stillman and Maré (2008) …nd 1 The de…nition of immigrants adopted in this article is based on country of birth. 2 See Dustmann and Glitz (2005) for a survey of this literature.
2 that immigration has only small e¤ects on house prices in Canada and New Zealand. These two studies use Census data and thus examine long-run e¤ects. Because housing supply is likely to be more elastic in the long-run, it is not surprising that immigration would have a smaller impact on house prices and rents between Census dates than between consecutive years.
This article studies the e¤ect of immigration on house prices in the UK. It is the …rst to study the e¤ects of immigration in the UK using data disaggregated by local authority. Previous studies work with a broader classi…cation of regions to match government o¢ ce regions. This is the only In contrast to what has been found for other countries, my results suggest that immigration has a negative e¤ect on house prices at the local level. Speci…cally, an immigration in ‡ow equal to 1% of the local initial population leads to a reduction of 1:6% in house prices. To explore the channels through which this e¤ect is likely to take place, I look at the e¤ect of immigration on native population growth and mobility and …nd that immigration leads to native out ‡ows. I then look at how this change in the composition of the local population a¤ects the local wage distribution. I …nd a positive correlation between immigration and the fraction of the local population in the …rst quartile of the wage distribution. This is mostly due to the fact that the native population tends to have lower wages in high immigration cities. Two factors are behind this result. First, there is some evidence that immigration reduces native wages at the lower end of the wage distribution.
Second, natives who move to a di¤erent local authority tend to be at the higher end of the wage distribution.
To study whether the e¤ect of immigration on house prices depends on the characteristics of the local immigrant population, I divide local authorities into four groups according to the level of education of the immigrant population. I …nd that the negative e¤ect of immigration on house prices is driven by local authorities where immigrants have lower education. This is consistent with immigration having a positive income e¤ect on housing demand in regions where immigrants have higher education (and higher wages), counteracting the negative income e¤ect generated by native out-mobility.
The …nal section of this article looks at results with more aggregated regions. To match previous studies, I divide England and Wales into ten government o¢ ce regions and repeat the analysis of the e¤ects of immigration on house prices using this de…nition of local market. The estimates are more imprecise because the sample is smaller and show no evidence that immigration has any e¤ect on house prices once regions are aggregated to this level. This is consistent with the analysis in Borjas (2006) and suggests that native mobility may di¤use the e¤ects of immigration throughout these broad regions. Immigration may have important economic e¤ects at the local level which are only captured when the labour market is de…ned at a su¢ ciently disaggregated level.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model that studies the e¤ect of immigration on house prices. The model allows for mobility by natives and includes an income e¤ect on the demand for housing. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology. Section 4 describe the data and descriptive statistics. Empirical results are reported and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 reports results with more aggregated regions and Section 7 presents conclusions.
The Model
A simple model is introduced to illustrate the link between immigration, native mobility and house prices. It follows closely the model in Saiz (2007) and extends it to include income e¤ects in housing consumption and the preference of natives for immigration. The model focuses on the e¤ects of immigration on a given city C.
There are two types of workers in the city: natives (N ) and immigrants (I). While immigrants are homogeneous, natives are heterogeneous both in wages and in their preference for local amenities. We assume that there are two types of natives in the city: high income natives (N H ) and low income natives (N L ). Due to mobility costs only high income natives can move from city C to an another city. Low income natives cannot move and their supply is treated as exogenous.
The preferences of high income native resident i is given by:
V iC is the value of the local amenities of city C for native i. The second term is a CobbDouglas utility function on consumption of housing services (h) and consumption of other goods (x). The last term captures the preference of natives for immigration. If natives have a distaste for immigration the coe¢ cient is positive. If natives like to live in cities with high immigration -for example, because they value cultural diversity -the coe¢ cient is negative.
Individuals maximize utility subject to the following budget constraint:
where R denotes housing rents and W H is the wage of high income native workers. The price of other goods x has been normalized to one.
The utility maximization problem delivers the following demand functions for housing and other goods: Ottaviano and Peri (2007) , where immigration has a positive e¤ect on the wages of highly educated natives due to complementarities in production and has a negative e¤ect on the wages of less educated natives due to substitution in production. In our model this would imply H < 0 and L > 0. To simplify the analysis, we do not consider complementarity or substitutability among native workers.
To model the mobility decision of high income natives, assume that the utility level that can be attained outside the city is U . Native resident i decides to stay in the city if U iC > U . The marginal native is indi¤erent between staying and leaving. Substituting the demand functions (2) into the utility function (1) gives the following indi¤erence condition for the marginal native N H :
This condition determines the number of high income native residents in the city:
The supply of immigrants I is treated as exogenous and immigrants are assumed to always prefer to stay in city C. We further assume that the demand of housing services by low income natives and by immigrants is identical to that of high income natives. Immigrants are homogeneous and have wage W I .
The total demand for housing services equals the sum of the demand by natives and by immigrants:
The term in square brackets is total wealth in the city. Taking logs of this equation:
The response of housing costs to immigration and native mobility depends on the elasticity of supply. In areas where housing supply is more elastic, housing costs should increase by less in response to an increase in demand. The link between house prices and supply elasticity is studied in Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008 To capture the e¤ect of the elasticity of housing supply on the response of housing costs to immigration and native mobility, I follow Saiz (2007) and adopt the following speci…cation for housing supply:
where 1 is the price elasticity of housing supply and P is the price of housing, which equals the present value of housing rents discounted at rate d: P = R d or ln P = ln R ln d. In equilibrium housing demand equals supply. Combining equations (4) and (5) gives:
We are interested in the e¤ect of immigration on house prices dP dI . From the equation (6), we have:
Using the de…nition of wealth we obtain:
If immigrant in ‡ows are completely o¤set by native out ‡ows (
, there may still be an e¤ect on wealth and house prices even if native wages are not a¤ected (i.e., H = L = 0). This happens if the wages of natives who leave are di¤erent from the wages of immigrants who come into the city (i.e., W H 6 = W I ). In this case, the level of wealth in the city will change and house prices will be a¤ected via the income e¤ect.
It can also be seen that, even if immigration has no impact on the mobility decisions of natives The mobility response of natives to immigration ( dN H dI ) can be derived from equation (3):
Natives respond to immigration by moving out of the city if immigration has a negative e¤ect on native wages (positive H ), if it has a positive e¤ect on house prices (positive dP dI ) and if natives have a distaste for immigration (positive ).
Combining equations (7), (8) and (9) gives:
The sign of the e¤ect of immigration on house prices is ambiguous. The e¤ect will tend to be negative if immigration leads to a reduction in native wages ( H > 0 and L > 0) and if natives dislike immigration ( > 0). In this case, high income natives will leave the city and house prices will be depressed. On the other hand, the e¤ect will tend to be positive if complementarities in production lead to a positive e¤ect of immigration on native wages ( will respond to demand conditions: an increase in demand will lead to more housing construction and a smaller increase in house prices, while a reduction in demand will lead to less construction and a smaller reduction in prices.
With this theoretical framework in mind, I now turn to the empirical evidence. I …rst look at the e¤ect of immigration on house prices and then explore the channels that the model indicates to be important in determining this e¤ect. In particular, I study the e¤ect of immigration on native mobility and wages.
Methodology
The following model is used to estimate the e¤ect of immigration on house prices:
where ln(P it ) is the change in the log of the house price index in local authority i between years t 1 and t. The main independent variable is the annual in ‡ow of immigrants divided by the initial population. The coe¢ cient can be interpreted as the percentage change in house prices corresponding to an annual in ‡ow of immigrants equal to 1% of the local initial population. X it is the change in employment to population ratio at the local level, which controls for macroeconomic conditions. Year dummies ( t ) capture national trends in in ‡ation and other economic variables.
Since the model is written in …rst-di¤erences, time-invariant factors that are speci…c to each local authority and that a¤ect the level of house prices have been di¤erenced out. However, results will also be reported including local authority dummies ( i ) to capture di¤erent trends in house prices at the local level.
The e¤ect of immigration on house prices is identi…ed from spatial correlations between immigrant in ‡ows and changes in house prices across local authorities. There are two potential problems in interpreting these correlations as causal e¤ects. First, immigrant in ‡ows and house prices may be spatially correlated because of common …xed in ‡uences, for example, the climate or local amenities.
This would lead to a correlation between immigrant in ‡ows and house prices, even in the absence of Speci…cally, the instrument for the annual in ‡ow of immigrants into local authority i as a share of the population is de…ned as:
where cit 0 is the share of individuals born in foreign region c that live in local authority i in the base year t 0 . This provides a measure of the size of the network from foreign region c in each local authority i. F B ct is the in ‡ow of immigrants born in foreign region c to the UK as a whole in year t. The predicted number of new immigrants from foreign region c in year t that choose to locate in local authority i is cit 0 F B ct . Summing across all regions of origin we obtain a measure of the House price data at the local authority level are from the Land Registry. This data set is based on a record of all residential property transactions made in England and Wales since January 1995, whether with cash or with a mortgage. It contains details on over 15 million sales. An index is constructed from these sales data, which is seasonally adjusted and corrects for changes in the quality of housing by using repeated sales. Out of the 15 million sales for which data are collected, just over …ve million are identi…able matched pairs, providing the basis for the repeated sales regression analysis used to compile the index. This index is then used to construct seasonally adjusted standardized (i.e. corrected for quality) average house prices across local authorities.
Standardized average prices are calculated by taking the geometric mean price for each area in Chelsea registering an average price well above £ 800,000. Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (11) . The dependent variable is the change in the log of the house price index and the main independent variable is the change in the for- The OLS coe¢ cient is negative and statistically signi…cant. This coe¢ cient cannot be interpreted as the causal e¤ect of immigration on house prices because the locational choice of immigrants is not random. To overcome this problem, I use the settlement pattern of immigrants from the 1991 Census to predict the geographic distribution of immigrants in the current period. Table 5 reports the …rst stage regression where the dependent variable is the change in the foreign-born population in a local authority over the local population in the previous year. The main explanatory variable is the instrument: the change in the predicted foreign-born population relative to the total initial population. The coe¢ cient is 0:866 and is signi…cant at the 1% level. This suggests a strong correlation between the current geographic distribution of immigrants and the predicted geographic distribution based on their historical settlement pattern.
Results

Immigration and House Prices
The IV estimates are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table A second reason why immigration may generate a negative e¤ect on house prices is if immigrants and natives are substitutes in production. In this case, an immigrant in ‡ow would lead to a reduction in native wages. Provided immigrant wages are not large enough to compensate for the reduction in native wages, local wealth would decrease generating a reduction in house prices.
To understand the mechanism behind the negative e¤ect of immigration on local house prices, I look at how immigration a¤ects native population growth and mobility and the wages of the local population.
Immigration and Native Population Growth and Mobility
Since the UK-born have very low emigration rates, at the national level each additional immigrant adds one person to the total population. At the local level, however, there are substantial movements of population that can potentially o¤set immigrant in ‡ows.
To study the e¤ect of immigration on native population growth, I follow Card (2007) and estimate the following model of the relation between the changes in the native and immigrant populations divided by the initial total population stock:
Year dummies ( t ) capture national trends in native population growth and other economic variables and local authority dummies ( i ) capture di¤erent trends in native population growth at the local authority level.
Because total population equals the sum of native and immigrant population (P op it = N it + F B it ), the growth rate of the total population can be written as:
Substituting this into equation (13) gives a relation between the growth rate of total population and the immigration in ‡ow:
In this model the coe¢ cient capture the e¤ect of immigrant in ‡ows on native population growth. A value of = 0 means that immigrant in ‡ows are not o¤set by native out ‡ows and each additional immigrant adds 1 to the total population. A value of = 1 means that immigrant in ‡ows are completely o¤set by native out ‡ows.
Model (13) su¤ers from the same endogeneity problem as model (11), i.e. the fact that the location choices of immigrants are not random. In this case the sign of the bias is easier to predict: the unobserved factors that lead to larger native population growth (the factors captured by the error term) are also likely to lead to larger immigrant in ‡ows, generating an upward-biased estimate of . I address this problem using the same instrument as in model (11): the predicted immigrant in ‡ow based on the historical settlement pattern of immigrants in 1991 divided by the initial population. Table 6 reports the results of estimating model (13) by OLS and IV. The OLS coe¢ cient is positive and signi…cant, but the IV coe¢ cient is negative. As expected, there is a positive bias in the OLS coe¢ cient since the unobserved factors that make a local area more attractive to natives also make it more attractive to immigrants. Once this endogeneity is taken into account, the coe¢ cient becomes negative and suggests that an immigrant in ‡ow equal to 1% of an area's initial population leads to a native out ‡ow equal to 0:849% of the area's initial population. Hence, total population in the area would increase by only 0:151% in response to a 1% immigrant in ‡ow.
Another way to study the response of the native population to immigration is to look at inmigration and out-migration rates. Using information on net migration between 11 government o¢ ce regions in the UK from National Health Service registration ‡ow data, Hatton and Tani (2005) show that there is a negative correlation between immigration to one region from abroad and in-migration from other regions. But this is only signi…cant for the southern regions where immigration of foreign citizens is most concentrated.
The LFS contains information on the region of residence one year ago at the local authority level. Using this information, I compute in-migration, out-migration and net migration rates for the native population. A native is classi…ed as having moved out of local authority i if he lived in that local authority in year t 1 and lives in a di¤erent local authority in year t. The out-migration rate is de…ned as the number of natives who moved out of local authority i between years t 1 and t divided by the native population of local authority i in year t 1. Similarly, a native is classi…ed as having moved into local authority i if he lives there in year t and lived in a di¤erent local authority in t 1. The in-migration rate is obtained by dividing the number of natives who moved into local authority i by the population of i in t 1. The net out-migration rate is simply the di¤erence between the out-migration and the in-migration rates.
The following model is used to examine the e¤ect of immigration on native out-migration, in-migration and net out-migration rates:
The dependent variable is the native out-migration, in-migration or net out-migration rate. The coe¢ cient can be interpreted as the change in these mobility rates generated by an immigration in ‡ow equal to 1% of the local authority's population. As for the growth rate of native population, this model su¤ers from an endogeneity problem, since the unobservable factors that lead natives to move into a region may also attract immigrants into that region. To account for this problem, the model is estimated with the usual instrument based on the historical settlement pattern of immigrants. Table 7 reports the results for the e¤ect of immigration on native mobility rates. An immigrant in ‡ow equal to 1% of the local initial population increases the native out-migration rate by 0:132 percentage points. This is quite a large e¤ect since the average native out-migration rate for the UK is only 2:7%. Immigration also increases native in-mobility rates, but the e¤ect is much smaller at 0:035 percentage points. The coe¢ cient on net out-migration equals the di¤erence between the coe¢ cients on out-migration and in-migration rates. On the whole, these results are consistent with the ones obtained for native population growth and suggest that immigrant in ‡ows are partly o¤set by native out ‡ows.
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Immigration and Native Wages
Another channel highlighted by the model in Section 2 through which immigration may a¤ect house prices is via its e¤ect on native wages. If immigrants and natives are substitutes in production, immigration should have a negative e¤ect on native wages. On the other hand, if they are complements immigration should have a positive e¤ect on native wages.
Using an approach similar to Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008), I study the e¤ect of immigration on native wages at di¤erent points in the native wage distribution. This study shows that if immigrants are placed in the wage distribution according to predicted wages based on their age and education, they would be located at the upper and middle part of the wage distribution.
However, if they are placed in the wage distribution according to their observed wage, they are at the lower end of this distribution. It is then plausible that immigration depresses native wages at the lower end of the wage distribution because immigrants and lower wage natives are substitutes in production.
To test this in my data, I use information on gross hourly wages from the LFS. To reduce the impact of outliers, the sample is trimmed to include observations between the 1 st and 99 th percentiles of the wage distribution in each year. I then regress …rst di¤erences in the log of the percentile p of native wages across di¤erent local authorities in the UK on the fraction of new immigrants in the initial population, year …xed e¤ects and local authority …xed e¤ects:
The model is estimated separately for the 25 th , 50 th and 75 th percentiles of the native wage distribution. To overcome the problem of endogenous allocation of immigrants into particular regional labour markets, I use the instrument given in equation (12) based on the settlement pattern of previous immigrants.
The results, reported in Table 8 , suggest that immigration has a negative but largely insigni…cant e¤ect on native wages. The e¤ect is only signi…cant in the IV regression for the 25 th percentile, suggesting that an immigration in ‡ow equal to 1% of the region's initial population reduces the 25 th percentile of native wages by 0:26%. This e¤ect is similar to the one found in Dustmann,
Frattini and Preston (2008).
Immigration and the Wage Distribution of the Local Population
The …ndings on native population growth and mobility suggest that immigration into a local area is partly o¤set by native out ‡ows. This change in the composition of the local population may have implications for the income distribution and hence for house prices. For example, if immigrants have lower income than natives, an in ‡ow of immigrants and an out ‡ow of natives would depress income in the local area and should lead to a reduction in demand for housing and in house prices.
To look at the e¤ect of immigration on the income distribution of the local population, I
compute the four quartiles of the national wage distribution for the total population (immigrants and natives) in each year 4 . In 2010 the 25 th percentile of the national wage distribution was $7:2 per hour, the median was $10:2 and the 75 th percentile was $15:5. Following Card (2007), I de…ne the following fractions:
iqt , q = 1; 2; 3; 4 is the fraction of all residents (natives and immigrants) in local authority i that have wages in each of the four quartiles of the national wage distribution in year t. p U K qt , q = 1; 2; 3; 4 is the fraction of all natives at the national level that have wages in each of the four quartiles of the national wage distribution in year t. Because the large majority of the population is UK-born, p U K qt should be close to 0:25.
p iqt , q = 1; 2; 3; 4 is the fraction of all native residents in local authority i that have wages in each of the four quartiles of the national wage distribution in year t.
q U K qt , q = 1; 2; 3; 4 is the fraction of all immigrants at the national level that have wages in each of the four quartiles of the national wage distribution in year t.
q iqt , q = 1; 2; 3; 4 is the fraction of all immigrant residents in local authority i that have wages in each of the four quartiles of the national wage distribution in year t.
In the absence of immigration or any di¤erential sorting of the native population across local authorities, the fraction of all residents in each quartile should be similar to the fraction of natives at the national level in each quartile, i.e., iqt ' p U K jt ' 0:25. Letting f it denote the share of immigrants in the population in local authority i in year t, the deviation from this counterfactual can be written as the sum of three terms:
The …rst term is a composition e¤ect: if the national fraction of immigrants in each skill group ( q U K qt ) di¤ers from the national fraction of natives (p U K qt ), regions with more immigrants will tend to be further away from the counterfactual share p U K jt . The second term captures the local selectivity of the immigrant population: if region i has more immigrants in wage group q than the national average, the fraction of the total population in wage group q in region i ( iqt ) will also be larger.
The third term is similar and captures the local selectivity of the native population.
To see how immigration a¤ects the wage distribution of the local population, I regress each component in equation (16) on the share of immigrants in the population at the local level (f it = F B it P op it ) and a set of local authority and year …xed e¤ects. This is done separately for each quartile of the wage distribution. The results are reported in Table 9 . Note that, because equation (16) holds identically, the coe¢ cients in columns 2 to 4 add up to the coe¢ cient in column 1.
Overall, there is a strong positive relation between the fraction of immigrants in a local authority and the fraction of residents in the lowest wage quartile, attributable mainly to the native selectivity e¤ect. Speci…cally, a 10 percentage point increase in the local fraction of immigrants is associated with a 2 percentage points increase in the fraction of the population in wage quartile 1, of which 0:4 percentage points is attributable to the pure composition e¤ect, 0:3 percentage points is attributable to the fact that the immigrant population tends to be have smaller wages in high immigration cities, and 1:3 percentage points is attributable to the fact that the native population tends to have smaller wages in high immigration cities. Similarly, there is a negative relation between the fraction of immigrants in a local authority and the fraction of residents in the highest wage quartile.
Again, this is mostly due to the fact that the native population tends to have smaller wages in high immigration cities.
These results could be driven by two factors. First, immigration could be driving down native wages. Second, natives who leave high immigration cities could be the ones at the top of the wage distribution. I have already presented some evidence that immigration has a negative e¤ect on native wages at the lower end of the wage distribution. To test whether natives who leave the city are at the top of the wage distribution, I work with individual-level data for natives and look at whether the probability of being in each of the four quartiles of the wage distribution is di¤erent for those who leave the city and those who stay. In particular, the following logit model is estimated separately for each quartile q of the native wage distribution (q = 1; 2; 3; 4):
The dependent variable D jqt is an indicator equal to 1 if native j earns a gross hourly wage in quartile q of the wage distribution and 0 otherwise. The independent variable of interest is moved jt , which is an indicator equal to 1 if native j moved to a di¤erent local authority between periods t 1 and t. This variable is constructed using the LFS and is based on the local authority of residence at the time of the survey and one year ago (the same data used to construct mobility rates). The model includes year and local authority …xed e¤ects. Table 10 reports the results of estimating this model for each quartile of the wage distribution.
There is some evidence that natives who move to a di¤erent local authority are more likely to be in the upper quartiles of the wage distribution, Speci…cally, natives who move to a di¤erent local authority have a probability of being in the …rst quartile of the wage distribution that is 9:6 percentage points lower than that of natives who do not move. The probability of being in the third quartile of the wage distribution is 12:4 percentage points higher for natives who move than for those who stay. This suggests that native out-mobility leads to a reduction in income at the local level which pushes down house prices via the income e¤ect.
The …nding that natives who move to a di¤erent local authority tend to be at the top half of the wage distribution combined with the …nding that immigration does not depress wages in that part of the wage distribution suggests that native out-mobility is not being driven by a reduction in wages. Looking at the determinants of native out-mobility in equation (9), the empirical results suggest that immigration has no e¤ect on wages of natives at the top of the wage distribution ( H = 0) and has a negative e¤ect on house prices ( dP dI < 0). This implies that native out-mobility is driven by other factors which are captured by a negative preference for immigration ( > 0).
Immigrant Education and the E¤ect of Immigration on House Prices
The model in Section 2 predicts that immigration is more likely to have a negative e¤ect on house prices in regions where immigrant wages are low. This is because high immigrant wages would push up housing demand via the income e¤ect.
To test this hypothesis, I use information on the highest quali…cation attained by immigrants from the LFS. I focus on education rather than wages to avoid potential endogeneity between house prices and wages. There could be unobserved factors which simultaneously a¤ect house prices and wages. Also, if immigrants work in the construction sector, a boom in house prices may lead to an increase in immigrant wages generating reverse causality. Working with education gets around these problems. 
Results with aggregated regions
The mobility response of natives presents challenges when trying to derive implications of our results for the national economy. Native out-migration has a negative income e¤ect on housing demand in local areas. However, natives who move push up housing demand in the local areas that To test whether this is also the case in my analysis, I estimate equation (11) Table 12 reports OLS and IV results. The …rst stage results are reported in Table 13 and con…rm the validity of the instrument with this broader de…nition of regions.
The estimates are more imprecise because the sample is much smaller. There is no evidence that immigration has any e¤ect on house prices once regions are aggregated to this level. This is consistent with the analysis in Borjas (2006) and suggests that native mobility may di¤use the e¤ects of immigration throughout these broad regions. Immigration may have important economic e¤ects at the local level which are only captured when the labour market is de…ned at a su¢ ciently disaggregated level.
Conclusion
There is a growing body of literature looking at the e¤ect of immigration on house prices in di¤erent countries. This is an important dimension of the economic e¤ects of immigration given the large weight that housing consumption has on the household budget. This article contributes to the immigration literature by estimating the e¤ect of immigration on house prices in the UK and highlighting the channels through which this e¤ect takes place.
Using data on immigration and house prices for 159 local authorities in England and Wales, I
…nd that immigration has a negative e¤ect on house prices. An in ‡ow of immigrants equal to 1%
of the local population reduces house prices by 1:6%. A simple theoretical model and my empirical estimates on native population growth and mobility suggest that one explanation for this negative e¤ect is the mobility response of natives. The estimates show that an immigrant in ‡ow equal to 1% of the local population leads to a native out ‡ow equal to 0:849% of the local population and increases the native out-migration rate by 0:132 percentage points.
Looking at the wage distribution of the local population, I …nd that local areas with high immigration tend to be at the bottom of the wage distribution. This is mostly due to the fact that natives have lower wages in high immigration cities. This …nding can be explained by two factors. First, there is some evidence that immigration has a negative e¤ect on native natives at the lower end of the wage distribution. Second, natives who leave the city are at the top of the wage distribution. This generates a negative income e¤ect on housing demand and pushes down house prices in local areas where immigrants cluster.
Behind these overall e¤ects, there are some important di¤erences depending on the level of education of the local immigrant population. The negative e¤ect of immigration on house prices is driven by areas where the share of immigrants with lower education is high. This is consistent with the intuition from the theoretical model which suggests that, in local areas where immigrants are more educated (and hence have higher wages), immigration exerts a positive income e¤ect on housing demand which counteracts the negative income e¤ect from native out-mobility. Source: Land Registry Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by local authority in parentheses. ∆ indicates first difference. Regressions include year and local authority fixed effects and the change in the employment to population ratio. The instrument is the change in the predicted foreign-born population relative to the total initial population. It uses the settlement pattern of immigrants in the 1991 Census to predict the number of foreign-born in each local authority in the current period. *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10% Notes: Coefficients reported are from regressions of the first difference in the log of native wages at the indicated percentiles of the distribution of native wages on the change in foreign-born population relative to the local initial population. Robust standard errors clustered by local authority in parentheses.
Regressions include year and local authority fixed effects. *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10% Notes: Coefficients reported are from regressions of the variable indicated in the column heading for each quartile of the wage distribution on the share of immigrants in the local population. Robust standard errors clustered by local authority in parentheses. Regressions include year and local authority fixed effects. *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10% Notes: Coefficients reported are from logit regressions for each quartile of the native wage distribution. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the native earns a wage in the indicated quartile of the distribution. The independent variable of interest is an indicator equal to one if the native has moved to a different local authority between consecutive years. Robust standard errors clustered by local authority in parentheses. Regressions include year and local authority fixed effects. *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10% Notes: Coefficients reported are from regressions of first-differences in the log of the house price index on the inflow of immigrants as a share of the initial population. Local authorities are divided into four groups according to the quartiles of the distribution of the share of immigrants with lower education (below GCSE). Separate regressions are estimated for each of these four groups of local authorities. Robust standard errors clustered by local authority in parentheses. Regressions include year and local authority fixed effects and the change in the employment to population ratio. *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10% Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∆ indicates first difference. Regressions include year and region fixed effects and the change in the employment to population ratio. The instrument is the change in the predicted foreign-born population relative to the total initial population. It uses the settlement pattern of immigrants in the 1991 Census to predict the number of foreign-born in each region in the current period. *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
